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in the structure of MNE activity. Third, we use the model to identify the mechanisms through which
country characteristics affect the structure of MNE activity. Finally, we provide a systematic assessment
of the model's shortcomings in order to inform the development of new theory.
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A tiny minority of ￿rms engage in international trade, and a still smaller fraction of ￿rms
own production facilities in more than one country. These internationally engaged ￿rms
are systematically di⁄erent than their domestically oriented peers. Firms that export are
larger and more productive than ￿rms that do not (Bernard and Jensen, 1999), while
￿rms that open foreign a¢ liates are still larger and more productive than ￿rms that only
export (Tomiura, 2007). A well-developed body of theory explains these phenomena as
the sorting of heterogeneous ￿rms into modes of foreign market access.1
In this paper, we investigate how well a model of ￿rm heterogeneity adapted from
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) can explain the cross-country structure of U.S. multi-
national activity. The model is built on two key assumptions. First, ￿rms face a trade-o⁄
in serving foreign markets: By opening a local a¢ liate, ￿rms avoid per unit transport
costs associated with trade but must instead incur ￿xed costs associated with managing
a foreign a¢ liate. Second, ￿rms di⁄er in their productivity. These assumptions imply
that for each country there is a productivity cuto⁄, which is determined by the country￿ s
characteristics, such that only those ￿rms whose productivity exceeds this cuto⁄will open
an a¢ liate in that country. Hence, the model predicts a ￿pecking order￿such that the
most productive ￿rms should open an a¢ liate in even the least attractive countries, while
progressively less productive ￿rms enter progressively more attractive countries.
In the model, country characteristics a⁄ect the aggregate volume of multinational
activity, measured as the sales of a¢ liates to host customers, through two channels. First,
country characteristics determine the productivity cuto⁄, and so a⁄ect the productivity
composition of the ￿rms that invest there. The key feature of the model is that a change in
a country characteristic that encourages a greater number of foreign ￿rms to open a local
a¢ liate must be inducing progressively less productive ￿rms to enter. Second, country
characteristics determine the optimal level of sales, holding ￿xed the set of ￿rms that own
an a¢ liate there.
We use the model and ￿rm-level data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
for all U.S. multinational enterprises for the year 1994 to make four empirical contribu-
tions. First, we show that more productive U.S. ￿rms own a¢ liates in a larger number
of countries and these a¢ liates generate greater revenue on sales in their host countries.
Previous studies, such as Girma, Kneller, and Pisu (2005), Head and Ries (2003), and
Tomiura (2007) show only that ￿rms that become multinational are systematically dif-
ferent than ￿rms that export. Our analyses demonstrate that this sorting extends to the
scale and scope of multinational enterprises: more productive ￿rms own a¢ liates in a
larger set of countries and their a¢ liates are larger than those of less productive ￿rms.
This sorting has quantitatively important implications for the aggregate structure of U.S.
multinational activity.
The second contribution of our analysis is to assess how important ￿rm heterogene-
1See, for instance, Melitz (2003), Bernard et al (2003), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).
2ity is in determining the structure of U.S. multinational activity. We show that as a
country becomes more attractive to U.S. multinationals, it attracts progressively smaller
and less productive ￿rms. For instance, our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in
a country￿ s GDP per capita leads to a 7.6% increase in the number of U.S. ￿rms that
enter that country, but because new entrants are less productive than old entrants, the
average productivity of all entrants falls by 2.0%. Thus, the contribution of the extensive
margin, adjusted for the productivity composition of entrants, is 5.6%. Although there
are several papers exploring the importance of ￿rm heterogeneity models in the structure
of international trade (e.g. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2005), little has been done
to investigate whether this body of theory improves our understanding of the aggregate
structure of multinational activity.
Our third contribution is to use the structure of the model to disentangle the mecha-
nisms through which individual country characteristics a⁄ect the structure of U.S. multi-
national activity. For example, while it has long been known that horizontal FDI is pri-
marily attracted to developed countries, previous analyses do not shed light as to exactly
why this is the case. We show that multinational activity is increasing in a host coun-
try￿ s GDP per capita because individual entrants face greater e⁄ective demand in richer
countries not because these countries have relatively lower entry costs. The analysis gen-
erates similarly surprising conclusions concerning the mechanisms through which physical
distance and a shared language a⁄ect the structure of U.S. multinational activity.2
The fourth contribution of this paper is to assess the manner in which the model fails.
We document systematic deviations from the pecking order. Although multinational
activity is highly concentrated in the most productive ￿rms, the model predicts that an
even greater concentration of a¢ liate sales in the largest ￿rms than is actually observed.
In particular, larger ￿rms underinvest in the least attractive countries. These observations
should prove useful for the future development of models of ￿rm heterogeneity.3
The remainder of this paper is divided into ￿ve sections. In section 2, we use a
version of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) to derive predictions over the investment
behavior of individual ￿rms and to specify a structural econometric model of aggregate
multinational activity. In section 3, we describe the ￿rm-level data and the set of ￿rm
and country characteristics used to estimate this model. In section 4, we present the main
results of our empirical analyses. The results con￿rm that it is important to account for
￿rm heterogeneity in order to understand the structure of aggregate multinational a¢ liate
sales, and they illuminate the channels through which country characteristics in￿ uence
2In this respect, our analysis is similar in ￿ avor to Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) who use a
model of ￿rm heterogeneity and trade to disentangle the e⁄ect of distance on trade patterns. There is also
some similarity to the work of Head and Ries (2008). They propose a mechanism that probabilistically
assigns ￿rms to countries. They too use their structural model to interpret the data.
3In this sense, our paper is similar to Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) who show that the Melitz (2003)
model of ￿rm heterogeneity ￿ts certain facts well while systematically failing along other dimensions.
Unlike Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) we do not pursue speci￿c adjustments to the model to address these
short-comings.
3multinational activity. In section 5, we calculate the structure of multinational a¢ liate
sales that would be observed if the pecking order were strictly observed and compare this
counterfactual measure to the actual structure in order to demonstrate precisely how the
model falls short. The ￿nal section concludes and presents suggestions for future research.
2 The Analytical Framework
We use a framework based on Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to organize an econo-
metric analysis of the structure of U.S. multinational activity across a range of host
countries.4 We ￿rst specify the model and generate ￿rm level predictions. We then aggre-
gate over individual ￿rms to form country-wide predictions. Finally, we develop a series
of equilibrium conditions that can be taken to the data.
2.1 The Model










+ (1 ￿ ￿)lnY
where ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿, ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erentiated goods,
and Y is a freely-traded homogenous good that is produced in every country. These
preferences imply the following demand curve in country j,
xj(!) = ￿Ej (Pj)
￿￿1 pj(!)
￿￿; (1)
where Ej is gross national expenditure in country j, Pj is the price index in country j,
and pj(!) is the price of variety ! in country j.
There are J countries indexed by j. In country j the mass of ￿rms is Nj. Each ￿rm
is capable of producing a single variety of the di⁄erentiated good using a single input
called labor. The price of labor in country j is wj. The wage is determined in the
homogenous-good industry Y . Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity ’.5
The empirical distribution of ’ in each country G is assumed to be Pareto, i.e.






4The model presented in this section di⁄ers from that presented in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
in two respects. First, the model is not closed via a free entry condition. Second, because we do not
observe ￿rm-level exports in our dataset, we do not include a ￿xed cost of exporting.
5Variation in productivity across ￿rms can be thought of more generally as variation in ￿rm charac-
teristics that lead to a higher value of output per unit input. As pointed out by Melitz (2003), variation
in productivity across ￿rms is isomorphic to variation in quality across ￿rms when preferences are CES.
4where k > ￿ ￿ 1.
Each ￿rm sells its variety in each country. In serving foreign markets, a ￿rm faces a
trade-o⁄ in the way that it organizes its production. If a ￿rm from country h chooses
to export its variety from country h to a foreign country j, it faces wage wh and incurs
iceberg transport cost ￿hj > 1. Alternatively, the ￿rm may avoid this transport cost by
opening an a¢ liate in country j. Setting up an a¢ liate in country j requires the ￿rm
to incur the ￿xed cost Fj. The ￿rm must also pay the local labor cost wj. We assume
that technology transfer is perfect so that the ￿rm￿ s productivity is the same in every
country. To focus on the pure proximity-concentration trade-o⁄, we abstract away from
the possibility that a ￿rm engages in export platform FDI and vertical FDI by assuming
that transport costs are relatively high compared to wage di⁄erences between countries
so that wh￿hj > wj for all h and j.6
In the remainder of this section, we derive equilibrium conditions to organize the
empirical analyses, but we do not solve for the full general equilibrium of the model.
In particular, the equilibrium price index will not be derived, because it is a complex
function of a country￿ s geography. As such, we will need to take a reduced form approach
in relating the certain country variables, such as the price index, to country characteristics
when implementing our empirical work.
2.2 Firm Mode Choice
We begin our analysis by considering the foreign direct investment decisions of individual
￿rms with headquarters located in country h. Let the marginal cost of serving country
j for a ￿rm with productivity ’ from country h be chj(’). As is well-known, a ￿rm




where Aj ￿ ￿￿￿1￿EjP
￿￿1
j is the mark-up adjusted demand level in country j and Pj is
the price index in country j. A ￿rm from country h with productivity ’ that sells its
product in country j will face marginal costs of
chj(’) =
￿
wh￿hj=’ if it exports to country j,
wj=’ if it produces in country j.
and so will generate revenues of
Rhj(’) =
￿
[Aj(wh￿hj)1￿￿]’￿￿1 if it exports to country j,
[Aj(wj)1￿￿]’￿￿1 if it produces in country j. (2)
6For an analysis of a very di⁄erent geography were a¢ liate exports are prominently featured in a
model of ￿rm heterogeneity, see Yeaple (2008).
5Because wh￿hj > wj and ￿ > 1 the revenue generated by an a¢ liate will exceed the







A ￿rm￿ s sales revenue in each market (including its home market) is proportional to its
productivity index ’￿￿1. Because each ￿rm serves its home country h from a local plant,
home sales are a conceptually valid measure of a ￿rm￿ s productivity. These observations
will be important in the empirical work that follows.
A ￿rm of productivity ’ generates gross pro￿ts on sales in country j that are propor-
tional to its revenues in that market: ￿(chj(’)) = Rhj(’)=￿. Using equation (2) it follows

















￿￿1 ￿ Fj. (4)
Both ￿X(’) and ￿M(’) are linear and increasing in a ￿rm￿ s productivity index ’￿￿1, but
￿M(’) increases faster than ￿X(’) because we have assumed that wh￿hj > wj. Because
￿M(0) < ￿X(0), it follows that there exists a country-pair speci￿c cuto⁄ productivity
index b ’
￿￿1
hj such that all ￿rms from source country h with productivity index ’￿￿1 ￿ b ’
￿￿1
hj
engage in FDI in country j and all ￿rms with productivity ’￿￿1 < b ’
￿￿1
hj export instead.














Equation (5) shows that the determinants of the cuto⁄ productivity index b ’
￿￿1
hj can be
decomposed into the two components shown in parentheses. Shown in the ￿rst parentheses
is the inverse of a measure of the country-speci￿c scale of operations Ajw
1￿￿
j . Everything
else equal, an increase in the mark-up adjusted demand level Aj or a reduction in the
local cost of production wj will lower the cuto⁄ productivity index, inducing relatively
less productive ￿rms to invest. Shown in the second parentheses is a measure of the ￿xed
cost of opening an a¢ liate in country j relative to a measure of the marginal-cost savings
made possible by opening a local a¢ liate in country j. An increase in the ￿xed cost
Fj or a reduction in the marginal-cost savings [1 ￿ (wh￿hj=wj)1￿￿] increases the cuto⁄
productivity index.
Earlier, we showed that ￿rms with larger home market sales must have a higher pro-
ductivity index ’￿￿1 and so earn larger revenues in each country in which they own an
6a¢ liate. Now note that ￿rms with large home market sales also invest in a larger number
of countries because their productivity index will exceed the cuto⁄productivity index for
a larger number of countries. Let ￿hj be the set of ￿rms that invest in country j. Suppose
that the number of ￿rms that originate in h and invest in country j is increasing in j so
that country J is the most attractive. Then, it must be the case that
￿h1 ￿ ￿h2 ￿ ￿h3 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿hJ:
This is known as the ￿pecking order￿because every ￿rm from h that owns an a¢ liate in
country j also owns an a¢ liate in every country k > j.
2.3 The Aggregate Structure of Multinational Activity
In this section, we compute the value of aggregate local sales in country j of the a¢ liates
owned by ￿rms from country h. In the empirical analysis below, country h will be the







The superscript on S
j
hj indicates the country of sales while the subscripts indicate the sales
are determined by variation in the number of ￿rms from country h that own a¢ liates in
country j. Using equations (2) and (5), the aggregate sales of a¢ liates from country h

















The ￿rst term in parentheses is the country-speci￿c scale of operations of foreign a¢ liates,
holding ￿xed the identity of the ￿rms investing in country j, and the second term in
parentheses is a measure of the number and the productivity composition of ￿rms from
country h that open an a¢ liate in country j. Equation (6) illustrates an important feature
of this model of ￿rm heterogeneity. Holding ￿xed the sale of operations (Ajw
1￿￿
j ), an
increase in multinational activity is driven by expansion of the number of ￿rms investing
in the country, or a decrease in b ’hj. A decrease in b ’hj implies, however, that the additional
￿rms being attracted are less productive than the incumbent ￿rms. Hence, as the number
of ￿rms that invests in the country expands, the average productivity of the entrants falls.
To analyze the role of sorting in the structure of aggregate multinational activity, we




















hj is the sales of the set of ￿rms from country h that own an a¢ liate in country j in
their home country h, and Nhj is the size of that set in terms of the number of ￿rms from
country h that invest in country j. Note that because Sh
hj and S
j
hj are calculated using
using the same set of ￿rms, the ￿rst term in parentheses is a measure of how countries














The second term in (7) is the number of ￿rms from country h that invest in country j
and is equal to
Nhj = Nh
￿







The second line of (9) is obtained by substituting the de￿nition of G(’) = 1 ￿ bk’￿k.
The third term in (7) measures the average productivity of the set of ￿rms from country
h that open an a¢ liate in country j, as measured by their parent ￿rms￿sales in the home





















Note that the home country scale (Ahw
1￿￿
h ) does not vary across destination countries j,
so that only the average productivity index varies across destination countries.
Combining equations (7) through (10) with equation (5) allows us to link the relevant
country characteristics identi￿ed by theory (those associated with Ajw
1￿￿
j and Fj(1 ￿
(wh￿hj=wj)1￿￿)￿1) to the aggregate volume of multinational activity and to the individual
components (scale, number, and average productivity). A key feature of the model can be
obtained by comparing equations (9) and (10). The number of a¢ liates in country j is
decreasing in the cuto⁄ productivity b ’hj while the average productivity is increasing in
















This equation shows that the relationship between the number of entrants and the average
productivity of entrants is governed by k
￿￿1, which is a measure of the degree of size
dispersion across ￿rms. Everything else equal, the greater the size dispersion across ￿rms
(the smaller is k
￿￿1), the greater the degree of heterogeneity in the productivity index, and
the stronger is the negative relationship between the number and average productivity of
entrants across countries.
82.4 Country Characteristics and Mechanisms
In this section, we show how components of the decomposition presented in (7) can
be reorganized to isolate meaningful sets of model parameters. These sets of parame-





h ), and the ratio of the ￿xed cost of FDI to the marginal-cost bene￿t of
FDI, or Fj=[1 ￿ (wh￿hj=wj)1￿￿]. We do not attempt to ￿nd an empirical analog for every
variable in the model. For instance, the mark-up adjusted demand level Aj is a function
of the price index Pj, which is an endogenous and complicated function of a country￿ s
location. Further, di⁄erences in marginal cost and ￿xed costs across countries are di¢ cult
to specify. Instead, we take a reduced-form approach, relating components of the model
to observable country characteristics. We then use the model to identify which of two
mechanisms country characteristics a⁄ect the structure of multinational sales.
As noted above, there are two mechanisms through which variation in country charac-
teristics a⁄ect the structure of multinational activity across countries. The ￿rst is directly
related to scale as illustrated in equation (8). We assume that the country-speci￿c scale,
which is directly measurable using data on the sales of a¢ liates in country j to the sales of
their parent ￿rms in country h, is related to a vector of observable country characteristics
















￿ ￿logZj + "j: (12)
The second mechanism through which country characteristics a⁄ect the cross-country
structure of multinational activity is through their e⁄ect on the relative magnitude of ￿xed
costs Fj to the measure of unit cost savings of multinational activity [1 ￿ (wh￿hj=wj)1￿￿].







= ￿logZj + ￿j: (13)

















k ￿ ￿ + 1
￿
+ ￿logZj + ￿j: (14)
By estimating equations (12) and (14), we can identify the mechanisms through which
individual country characteristics in￿ uence the aggregate structure of multinational ac-
tivity. The vector of coe¢ cients ￿ summarize the e⁄ect of country characteristics on
a¢ liate scale, while the coe¢ cients ￿ summarize the e⁄ect of country characteristics on
the relative size of concentration costs versus proximity bene￿ts of FDI.
93 Data
This study relies on the con￿dential enterprise-level data collected by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). The BEA conducts annual surveys of U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad where U.S. direct investment is de￿ned as the direct or indirect ownership or
control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least 10 percent of the voting securities of an
incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unicorporated busi-
ness enterprise. A U.S. multinational entity (MNE) is the combination of a single U.S.
legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one
foreign business enterprise, called the foreign a¢ liate. The International Investment and
Trade in Services Survey Act requires that all ￿rms larger than a certain size ￿le detailed
￿nancial and operating items for the parent ￿rm and each a¢ liate.
The dataset includes every manufacturing a¢ liate that is majority owned by a U.S.
parent company whose main-line-of-business is a manufacturing industry for the bench-
mark survey year 1994. For each a¢ liate, we observe the country in which the a¢ liate
is located, the main-line-of-business of the a¢ liate and the volume of sales to customers
based in that country.7 For every parent ￿rm, we observe the ￿rm￿ s main-line-of-business,
its sales to customers located in the United States, and which a¢ liates it owned. To
calculate each parent ￿rm￿ s total factor productivity, we also extracted employment and
capital stock data from the BEA dataset. When a ￿rm owned more than one manufactur-
ing a¢ liate in a given foreign country, we aggregated the volume of sales across a¢ liates
to form a single ￿rm-country observation. When we disaggregate the sample by industry,
we use the industry of the parent ￿rm.
To construct our measure of local a¢ liate sales in country j, S
j
j (note the source
country subscript has been dropped because the United States is the sole source country
the superscript indicates that these are the sales of the set of ￿rms investing in country j
in country j), we aggregate the sales of all U.S. a¢ liates in country j. Our measure of the
number of entrants Nj corresponds to the total number of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms that
own manufacturing a¢ liates in country j. Our measure of the productivity composition
of U.S. ￿rms that invest in country j, SUS
j , is the sum of all the U.S. sales of all U.S.
parents that own a manufacturing a¢ liate in country j. The dependent variables used in








Following the recent literature we interpret the model as applying to aggregate man-
ufacturing activity rather than as at the industry level.8 Each ￿rm is then interpreted
as producing a unique good, and the ￿xed, transport, and production costs are assumed
7Because our model is in the proximity-concentration tradition of Brainard (1997), we focus on the
local sales of the a¢ liates. These sales account for roughly sixty percent of the sales of majority-owned
foreign a¢ liates of U.S. multinational enterprises.
8We have in mind, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Head and
Ries (2008), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008).
10to be common across manufacturing. As a robustness check, however, we also consider a
sample in which ￿rms are disaggregated by industry. Hence, these measures were com-
puted at two di⁄erent levels of industrial aggregation: at the level of total manufacturing
and at the level of the three-digit BEA industry. As a robustness check, we also measure
the country-speci￿c cuto⁄ productivity index b ’
￿￿1
j directly using the local a¢ liate sales
of the smallest U.S. a¢ liates in country j.
We now turn to the country characteristics that are included in the set of independent
variables Zj. We do not attempt to de￿ne proxies for every variable in the model. Proxies
for variables such as country-level ￿xed costs tend to be highly correlated with many other
country characteristics. Instead, we choose to use standard gravity variables, which have
been shown to explain most of the country variation in multinational activity. The key
innovation of our analysis is to show how these variables a⁄ect the various margins of
foreign a¢ liate activity and to use the structure of the model to identify the mechanism
through which these variables a⁄ect foreign a¢ liate activity.
The gravity variables included are GDP, which is the logarithm of a country￿ s gross
domestic product in 1994; GDPPC, which is the logarithm of a country￿ s GDP per capita
in 1994; DIST, which is the logarithm of the distance between Washington D.C. and the
capitals of each country in the dataset; and ENGLISH, which is an indicator for whether
English is a major language in the destination country. The variables GDP and GDPPC
are taken from the Penn World Tables. The variable DIST is taken from Andy Rose￿ s
website.9
4 Results
In this section, we report the results of several related analyses. We begin with a descrip-
tive analysis of the foreign investment behavior of individual U.S. ￿rms to establish that
a key prediction of the model, that more productive ￿rms have larger multinational net-
works, is true in the data. We then present the main results of the paper: those associated
with estimating the e⁄ect of country characteristics on manufacturing a¢ liate sales and
the three components identi￿ed in the decomposition shown in equation (7). We also use
the model to interpret the mechanisms through which country characteristics a⁄ect the
structure of U.S. multinational activity. Finally, we conduct several robustness checks.
9The 49 countries included in the dataset are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom,
Russia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
114.1 The Investment Behavior of Individual Firms
In this section, we provide a simple descriptive analysis of the foreign production activity
of individual U.S. multinational ￿rms. We ￿rst explain the propensity of ￿rms to invest
in any given foreign market as a function of a parent ￿rm￿ s measured productivity. We
use two measures of a parent ￿rm￿ s productivity: the logarithm of the value of the parent
￿rm￿ s sales in the United States and the logarithm of the parent ￿rm￿ s TFP.10 We estimate
a simple linear probability model that allows us to control for host country and industry
￿xed e⁄ects. Second, we regress the logarithm of individual ￿rms￿local sales in foreign
countries on the logarithm of their parent ￿rms￿U.S. sales and their TFP. Descriptive
statistics can be found in appendix table 1.
The results are shown in Table 1. The ￿rst two columns correspond to the coe¢ cient
estimates obtained from the linear probability model. The dependent variable is equal
to one if a ￿rm owns an a¢ liate in that country and is equal to zero otherwise. The
￿rst column corresponds to the speci￿cation using the logarithm of parent ￿rm size as
measure of ￿rm e¢ ciency, while the second corresponds to the speci￿cation using the
logarithm of parent ￿rm TFP. In both speci￿cations, the measure of ￿rm e¢ ciency is
positive and statistically signi￿cant, indicating that more e¢ cient ￿rms are more likely to
own an a¢ liate in any given host country. The results are very similar if industry ￿xed
e⁄ects are not controlled.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show the results of regressing the logarithm
of a foreign a¢ liate￿ s sales on the logarithm of its parent ￿rm￿ s productivity and country
and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. The third column corresponds to the speci￿cation in which ￿rm
productivity is measured using parent ￿rm sales in the United States, while the fourth
column corresponds to the speci￿cation in which ￿rm productivity is measured using
parent ￿rm TFP. In both speci￿cations, a¢ liate size is increasing in the parent ￿rm￿ s
productivity. The results are very similar if industry ￿xed e⁄ects are not controlled.11
Earlier studies (e.g. Tomiura 2007) demonstrate that larger, more productive ￿rms
are more likely to become multinationals. The results shown in Table 1 extend the body
of knowledge, showing that the scope (number of a¢ liates) and scale (size of its a¢ liates)
of a ￿rm￿ s multinational activities, are also increasing in the ￿rm￿ s productivity.
4.2 Firm Heterogeneity and the Aggregate Structure of Multi-
national Activity
In this section, we report the e⁄ects of regressing the logarithm of aggregate a¢ liate sales
and the logarithm of the components of these sales as expressed in equation (7) on the
10Given that the model features constant mark-ups, parent sales in the home market are the preferred
measure of parent ￿rm productivity. We include TFP for completeness.
11The fact that the coe¢ cient on the logarithm of parent ￿rm sales in the United States is less than
one is inconsistent with the predictions of the model. We discuss this fact in greater detail later in the
paper.
12logarithm of the gravity variables. We ￿rst show that country characteristics that predict
a larger number of domestic entrants also predict a lower average productivity of the
parent ￿rms. We then use these coe¢ cient estimates to interpret the mechanisms through
which country characteristics in￿ uence the cross-country structure of U.S. multinational
activity. Finally, we provide an initial assessment of some of the strict predictions of the
model. The results reported in this section are generated using data aggregated to the
level of U.S. manufacturing. In the next section, we compare the results obtained when
cross-industry heterogeneity is controlled.
We begin by reporting the estimate of (￿ ￿ 1)=k obtained by estimating equation (11),
which relates the logarithm of the average parent ￿rm sales in the United States of the
set of ￿rms that own an a¢ liate in a given country to the logarithm of the number of U.S.
￿rms that own an a¢ liate in that country. This coe¢ cient summarizes the importance
of ￿rm heterogeneity in the structure of multinational activity. The larger the coe¢ cient
the greater the degree of ￿rm heterogeneity implied in the sample, and hence, the more
responsive is the productivity composition is to changes in the number of entrants.
The coe¢ cient estimate is found to be -0.258 with a standard error of 0.04 and an
R-squared of 0.36. This implies a value of k=(￿ ￿ 1) approximately equal to 4. This
result provides direct evidence of the type of sorting predicted by the model: A 10%
increase in the number of entrants into a given country is associated with a 2.5% decrease
in the average productivity index of entrants. In their study of the exporting behavior
of French ￿rms, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005) estimate a value of k=(￿ ￿ 1) or
approximately 1.5, which implies a much stronger composition e⁄ect.12
We now turn to the results of regressing the various measures of multinational activity
on country characteristics. The main results are shown in Table 2.1314 Column 1 reports
the coe¢ cient estimates obtained by regressing aggregate multinational sales onto the set
of gravity variables. Consistent with other studies, we ￿nd that the four variables account
for much of the variation in a¢ liate sales across countries as indicated by the R-squared
of 0.738. The local a¢ liate sales of U.S. multinationals are increasing in a country￿ s GDP,
in its per capita GDP, and are higher in English-speaking countries. A¢ liate sales are
also strongly decreasing in distance: a 10% increase in the distance between the U.S. and
a given host country is associated with a 7.6% decrease in these sales.
Column 2 reports the coe¢ cients obtained by regressing the logarithm of the number
of U.S. ￿rms that own an a¢ liate in a given country on the set of country characteristics.
The coe¢ cient estimates reported in column 2 have the same signs as those in column 1
and are smaller in absolute value. A 10% percent increase in GDP is associated with a
5.4% increase in the number of U.S. ￿rms present in that country and a 9.3% increase in
the sales of those a¢ liates (see column 1), implying that the average a¢ liate size increases
12Using di⁄erent data, Chaney (2007) reports a value closer to 2.
13The descriptive statistics for this sample can be found in Appendix Table 2.
14The nature of ordinary least squares guarantees that the sum of the coe¢ cient estimates of each
component (columns 2-4) is equal to the coe¢ cient estimate for in the total sales equation (column 1).
13by approximately 4.0%. As indicated by the fact that the coe¢ cients in column 2 are in
general more than half the size of the coe¢ cients in column 1, variation in the extensive
margin (the number of entrants) accounts for more than half of the variation in a¢ liate
sales. This is particularly true in the case of the variable ENGLISH, where the extensive
margin accounts for all of this variation.
Column 3 reports the e⁄ect of regressing the logarithm of the average productivity of
the parent ￿rms (as measured by sales in the U.S.) that own an a¢ liate in a given country
on the same set of country variables. Theory predicts that these coe¢ cients should be
opposite in sign to those in column 3 and that the absolute value of the ratio of coe¢ -
cients in column 3 to those in column 2 should be the same across country characteristics.
The ￿rst prediction of theory is consistent with the data. All four coe¢ cient estimates
in column 3 have the opposite sign as the corresponding coe¢ cient estimate in column 2.
For instance, a 10% increase in a country￿ s GDP is associated with a 5.4% increase in the
number of U.S. ￿rms owning an a¢ liate there, but a 1.4% decrease in the average produc-
tivity of the entrants. Of the four country characteristics, only DIST is not statistically
signi￿cant.
According to the theory, the coe¢ cient on each variable in the average productivity
equation should be equal to ￿(￿ ￿ 1)=k multiplied by coe¢ cient on the same variable in
the number equation (column 2). This is an implication of a single productivity cuto⁄
for each country. Hence, the absolute value of all of the coe¢ cient estimates in column
3 should be 0.26 of the absolute value of the coe¢ cient estimates in column 2. This is
true of the coe¢ cients on GDP (0.26) but is o⁄ for the coe¢ cient on DIST (0.50) and
very far o⁄for ENGLISH. From these estimates, we conclude that the structure of U.S.
aggregate multinational activity suggests sorting of the type present in the model, but
the prediction of a single threshold determined by one set of country characteristics is not
strictly consistent with the data.
Columns 4 report the coe¢ cient estimates from the speci￿cations relating the log-
arithm of scale to the set of country characteristics. Holding ￿xed the composition of
entrants, U.S. a¢ liates are larger in countries with larger market size (GDP), that are
richer (GDPPC), that are more proximate to the U.S. market (DIST), and where the
population speaks English (ENGLISH). The negative e⁄ect of distance and the posi-
tive e⁄ect of a shared language are particularly interesting. The negative coe¢ cient on
distance suggests that the marginal cost of production facing a¢ liates in countries far
from the United States is higher than in more proximate countries. There is nothing in
the standard proximity-concentration model that gives rise to this result, suggesting a
need to augment the model. One way to adjust the model to replicate this fact is to
include intermediate input purchases by the a¢ liate from their host country. The pos-
itive coe¢ cient on ENGLISH suggests that either the products of U.S. multinationals
are somehow more popular in English-speaking countries (larger market size) or that the
marginal cost of production is lower in these countries.
In the last column are the results obtained by regressing the logarithm of average
14a¢ liate sales to local customers on the same gravity variables. As noted above, these
results can be interpreted as describing the e⁄ect of these country characteristics on the
relative magnitude to country-speci￿c ￿xed costs to country-speci￿c proximity unit cost
bene￿ts of FDI.
The positive coe¢ cients on GDP and GDPPC are probably best interpreted as ev-
idence that ￿xed costs are rising in market size and level of development. The negative
coe¢ cient on DIST must be interpreted as either ￿xed costs that are decreasing in dis-
tance from the parent ￿rm or as proximity cost bene￿ts that are increasing in distance.
The latter interpretation is more natural given that most models of horizontal FDI should
have this feature. The negative e⁄ect of distance on aggregate multinational activity thus
appears to be due to the e⁄ect that higher marginal costs have on the scale of multina-
tional operations (and indirectly also through the cuto⁄ productivity level b ’
￿￿1) rather
than through the e⁄ect of ￿xed costs.15
Using the model to interpret the e⁄ect of a shared language on the structure of aggre-
gate activity, there appears to be no e⁄ect of language on the relative size of ￿xed costs to
unit proximity advantages as indicated by the statistical insigni￿cance of the coe¢ cient
on ENGLISH. Rather, the positive e⁄ect of a shared language on aggregate volumes
of multinational activity appears to work through its e⁄ect on scale (both directly and
through its e⁄ect on the cuto⁄ productivity level).
4.3 Robustness
We now estimate the same speci￿cations on a sample in which the unit of observation is
the country-industry. The bene￿t of considering a sample disaggregated by industry is
(1) we can control for unobserved heterogeneity across industries, and (2) we can compare
￿rms that are more likely to be competing in similar product markets. The disadvantage is
that the number of observations in which there is no observed entry becomes substantial:
more than half the country-industry pairs contain no U.S. multinational activity. There is
no immediate way to accommodate these zero observations as any country characteristic
that a⁄ects the likelihood of entry must, by the construction of the model, also a⁄ect the
identity of the entering ￿rms. That is, there cannot exist sensible exclusion restrictions.16
Another problem that arises is that some industry categories contain very few U.S. parent
￿rms.
The coe¢ cients obtained by estimating the same econometric model on the disaggre-
gated sample are shown in Table 3.17 The main qualitative di⁄erence in these estimates
compared to those of the aggregate analysis is that the absolute value of the coe¢ cients in
15Note that according to the model, the logarithm of the productivity cuto⁄index b ’
￿￿1 is equal to the
logarithm of average a¢ liate size minus the logarithm of a¢ liate scale. Hence, country characteristics
that a⁄ect scale have both direct and indirect e⁄ects on the structure of multinational activity.
16Note also that the average productivity of entrants when there are no entrants is not de￿ned when
there are no entrants, so techniques, such as Poisson estimation, are not appropriate in this context.
17For descriptive statistics see Appendix Table 3.
15the number and average productivity regressions is smaller, re￿ ecting a mixture of compo-
sition e⁄ects that have been controlled by including industry ￿xed e⁄ects and attenuation
bias stemming from the large number of zeros.
Focusing on the average productivity speci￿cation, we see that each coe¢ cient esti-
mate continues to have the opposite sign as that in the number regression but the pattern
of statistical signi￿cance is considerably di⁄erent. Now, the coe¢ cient on DIST is mar-
ginally statistically signi￿cant while the coe¢ cient on GDP is not.
We have taken the model seriously in measuring the average productivity of a ￿rm
by the parent ￿rm￿ s sales in the United States. As a robustness check, we consider the
composition of the productivities directly using the TFP of the parent ￿rm. The ￿rst two
columns of Table 4 correspond to a speci￿cation in which the logarithm of the average
TFP of the parent ￿rms that own an a¢ liate in a country are regressed on the same set of
gravity variables. The ￿rst column corresponds to the aggregate sample and the second
column corresponds to the sample disaggregated by industry.
The coe¢ cient estimates for the aggregate sample shown in column 1 have the expected
sign pattern. The average productivity of parent ￿rm entrants is decreasing in GDP and
GDPPC. Both coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients on DIST and
ENGLISH have their expected signs but are not statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient
estimates in the disaggregate sample shown in column 2 again have the expected signs.
None of the coe¢ cients are individually statistically signi￿cant at standard levels, but
an F-test of the joint signi￿cance of the four country variables indicate that they are
statistically signi￿cant at the ￿ve-percent level (F-statistic of 2.69). The lack of individual
statistical signi￿cance could re￿ ect substantial multicollinearity across the independent
variables.
The model has the strong implication that there should exist a￿pecking order￿across
countries: the largest most productive ￿rms should invest in all countries while the least
productive ￿rms should be located in only the most productive locations. To get at this
prediction, we follow Manova (2007) in focusing on the cuto⁄ directly. Our measure of
the productivity cuto⁄ is the logarithm of the U.S. sales of the smallest parent ￿rm that
invests in a country-industry pair. Given the Pareto assumption, the coe¢ cients reported
in these columns ought to be identical to those presented in the column 3 of Tables 2 and
3, respectively.
The results for the aggregate sample are shown in column 3 of Table 4, while the results
for the disaggregate sample are shown in column 4 of Table 4. As predicted by theory, the
coe¢ cient estimates in both columns are opposite in sign to those shown for the number
speci￿cations shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The cuto⁄ productivity level is lower
in developed countries (GDPPC) countries with large economies (GDP) that are close
to the United States (DIST) and where the main language is English (ENGLISH).
Interestingly, the coe¢ cient estimates are generally larger in absolute value in these spec-
i￿cations relative to the speci￿cations in which the logarithm of average productivity is
the dependent variable, and they tend to be much more precisely estimated. These re-
16sults suggest that the ￿pecking order￿can be observed in the sense that the smallest, and
presumably least productive ￿rms, invest in the most ￿attractive￿countries.18
5 An Alternate Assessment of Sorting
An important, and very strong, prediction of the model is that the structure of multina-
tional production across ￿rms should follow a ￿pecking-order￿ : the most productive ￿rms
invest in all foreign locations while the least productive ￿rms invest in only the most
attractive locations. While the results of the previous section suggest that on average
this pattern is implied by the data, it is clear that there must be some deviation from
the strictest form of the ￿pecking order.￿For instance, the composition regressions are
stronger when the smallest parent ￿rm size is used instead of average parent ￿rm size.
In this section, we consider the following class of counterfactual exercises. First, we
re-estimate the size distribution parameter (k=(￿ ￿ 1)) that would be observed if the
￿pecking order￿ were strictly observed in the data. Second, we consider the number
of countries in which individual ￿rms would own an a¢ liate were the ￿pecking order￿
strictly observed. Finally, we consider the aggregate volume of local a¢ liate sales across
countries that would be observed were the ￿pecking order￿strictly observed, and we show
how the structure of multinational activity would di⁄er from the structure that is actually
observed.
We begin by reporting the results obtained by regressing the logarithm of the average
size of U.S. sales of parent ￿rms that would be observed if the ￿pecking order￿were strictly
observed on the logarithm of the actual number of entrants by country. The coe¢ cient
estimate obtained is -0.746 with a standard error of 0.002 and an R-squared of 0.985. This
implies a size-dispersion parameter of (k=(￿ ￿ 1)) of approximately 1.5, which is more in
line with that found by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005). Compared to the number
obtained from the actual structure of U.S. multinational operations, this implies a much
greater degree of size dispersion than actually observed in the structure of multinational
sales. Put another way, this result suggests that the observation of entry by U.S. ￿rms is
insu¢ ciently concentrated in the largest and most productive ￿rms than what the model
would predict.
The actual and predicted propensity of ￿rms to open foreign a¢ liates as a function of
their productivity (as measured by sales in the United States) is illustrated in Figure 1.
In this ￿gure, ￿rms are organized into ￿ve size categories depending on their share of the
U.S. market. The largest ￿rms appear in category 1 while the smallest appear in category
5. The lighter bar on the right for each grouping is the actual average number of countries
in which ￿rms in that size category own a¢ liates. Consistent with the results reported
in Table 1, the more productive ￿rms own more a¢ liates. The darker bar on the left for
each grouping is the predicted number were the ￿pecking order￿strictly followed. Clearly,
18Considering the second smallest parent ￿rm generates very similar results.
17the dispersion in the number of countries entered is too small given the dispersion in U.S.
market shares: large ￿rms invest in too few foreign locations and small ￿rms invest in too
many.
To get a sense of the types of locations that large ￿rms underinvest and small ￿rms
overinvest, we created a counterfactual structure of multinational a¢ liate sales across
locations as shown in Figure 2. In the ￿gure, countries are sorted into ￿ve groups (10
countries per group) according to their ￿popularity.￿The lighter bar on the right cor-
responds to the actual average level (in logarithms) of a¢ liate sales of the U.S. ￿rms
investing in these countries. The darker bar on the left is the predicted average level (in
logarithms) of a¢ liate sales if instead the ￿pecking order￿were perfectly observed.19 That
is, holding ￿xed the country scale and the number of entering ￿rms, the level of a¢ liate
sales that would be observed if the productivities of those entrants perfectly followed the
pecking order.
There are two key observations that can be made concerning the di⁄erence between
actual and predicted levels of a¢ liate sales. First, in all countries there would be more
U.S. multinational activity were the pecking order followed. Second, the percentage de-
viation is larger for the least attractive countries. This observation, combined with the
observation that the largest ￿rms invest in too few locations, suggests that the largest
￿rms are underrepresented among the least attractive production locations. This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the observation in the last section that the productivity composition
of entrants as measured by the smallest entrant was better explained by country char-
acteristics than the productivity composition of entrants as measured by the size of the
average entrant.
6 Discussion and Suggestions for Future Research
This study has used a version of the model of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) to
several ends. First, the paper demonstrates that ￿rm heterogeneity does matter in un-
derstanding the structure of multinational activity: more productive ￿rms enter a larger
number of markets and sell more in each market that they enter than less productive
￿rms. Second, ￿rms tend to sort across countries in a manner that roughly approximates
a ￿pecking order.￿On average, countries with characteristics that are more attractive to
U.S. multinationals attract relatively less productive ￿rms. This result was particularly
strong when considering aggregate multinational activity, but was also present (albeit in
a somewhat weaker form) when considering data disaggregated by industry. Third, the
model was used to interpret the mechanisms through which country characteristics in￿ u-
ence the structure of U.S. multinational activity. Among the conclusions reached from
this analysis was that some variables typically hypothesized to work through ￿xed costs,
19In the decomposition given by (7), only the last term has been changed to compute this counterfactual
level of local a¢ liate sales.
18such as the e⁄ect of a common language or the e⁄ect of distance, actually appear to work
through the market size facing the individual U.S. ￿rm rather than through ￿xed costs.
An important contribution of the paper was also to demonstrate a number of short-
comings of the simple model presented in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). First, as
shown in the individual ￿rm analysis, the sales of a U.S. ￿rm￿ s a¢ liates are increasing
in the parent ￿rm￿ s productivity as measured by the parent ￿rm￿ s U.S. sales, but at rate
less than that predicted by the model. Second, the e⁄ect of distance on the structure of
FDI suggests that standard models of the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ are missing
an ingredient that would explain why the unit cost of serving foreign markets appears to
rise in distance. Finally, the counterfactuals considered in the last section demonstrate
that the largest ￿rms appear to invest in too few countries while the smaller ￿rms tend
to invest in too many. This underinvestment manifests itself in much less multinational
activity in relatively less attractive countries than would be predicted by the naive model.
The manner in which the simple model falls short suggests potentially fruitful ways
to design a model that is more consistent with the data. First, by including technology
transfer costs and trade in intermediate goods the e⁄ect of distance on the structure
of multinational activity can be better understood. Recent work by Keller and Yeaple
(2008) shows that this mechanism can capture this particular short-coming. Second,
the fact that the observed structure of multinational entry features too little entry by
the largest ￿rms suggests that diseconomies of scope across production locations may be
at work. Combining this assumption with demand systems featuring variable mark-ups
is a promising avenue for future work. As shown by Nocke (2006), when markups are
decreasing in the number of entrants and ￿rms can only invest in one location (extreme
diseconomies of scope) more productive ￿rms sort into larger markets and less productive
￿rms into smaller markets. Allowing less extreme diseconomies of scope may be a useful
avenue to extend Nocke (2006) to explain systematic deviations from the ￿pecking order￿
implied by standard models of ￿rm heterogeneity.20
20Variable mark-ups could also weaken the link between the sales of parent ￿rms in the United States
(a large market) and the sales of their a¢ liates abroad. As pointed out in the discussion of Table 1, the
coe¢ cient on the logarithm of parent ￿rm U.S. sales is less than one.
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Table 1: The Scope and Scale of Individual U.S. Multinationals’ Foreign 
Activities as a Function of Parent Firms’ Efficiency 
  Scope: Linear Probability Scale:  OLS  Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent Size  0.030 
(0.001) 
  0.538 
(0.013) 
 
Parent TFP    0.010 
(0.003) 
  0.765 
(0.067) 
Country FE  YES YES  YES  YES 











Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses. Both independent variables are in logarithms. TFP 
is measured as the residual of the regression of the logarithm of output per worker on the 
logarithm of capital per worker and the logarithm of the number of workers.  The coefficients in 
the TFP regression are 0.32 and 0.65 respectively.  The number of parent firms in the sample is 
1,036. 23 
 
Table 2: The Structure of Aggregate Multinational Activity by Component 

































































Notes: Heteroskedascity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Aggregate sales 
correspond to local affiliate sales of all manufacturing affiliates owned by U.S. parent firms in 
manufacturing industries. All independent variables, except ENGLISH, are in logarithms.  By 
construction, the coefficient estimates in column (1) are equal to the sum of the coefficients in 
columns (2)-(4). The coefficients in columns (4) and (5) have structural interpretations as Scale 
and Relative Costs. 24 
 
Table 3: The Structure of Multinational Activity by Component, 
Disaggregated by Three-Digit Industry 

































































Notes: All specifications include a full set of industry dummies.  Coefficients estimated by 
weighted least squares where the weights reflect country and industry sizes.  Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedascity and clustering by country. Aggregate sales correspond to local 
affiliate sales of all manufacturing affiliates owned by U.S. parent firms in manufacturing 
industries. All independent variables, except ENGLISH, are in logarithms.  The coefficients on 
the industry dummy variables are suppressed to ease exposition.  By construction, the coefficient 
estimates in column (1) are equal to the sum of the coefficients in columns (2)-(4). The 
coefficients in columns (4) and (5) have structural interpretations as Scale and Relative Costs. 25 
 
Table 4: Alternative Measures of Productivity Composition 
  Average TFP  The Cutoff Productivity Level 






















































Notes: Standard errors shown in parentheses.  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedascity 
and to clustering at the country level. Approximate TFP is calculated as in the Table 2.  The 
cutoff productivity level is calculated as the logarithm of the U.S. sales of the smallest parent 
firm that owns an affiliate in a country-industry pair.  Coefficients on the industry dummies in 
the disaggregated samples are suppressed to aid exposition. 26 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Versus Actual Number of Entrants by Size of Parent 
 
 
Notes: There are approximately 200 firms per size category.  The measure of size 
is the parent firms’ sales in the United States. 27 
 




Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Table 1 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Entry 0.077  0.26 
Log(affiliate sales)  9.97  1.60 
Log(parent sales)  12.49  1.79 
Log(parent TFP)  -0.073  0.45 
 
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Aggregate Sample (Tables 2 
and 4) 
Variable Name  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Log(Aggregate Sales)  14.59  1.61 
Log(Number) 3.84  1.02 
Log(Average Productivity) 
measure: parent sales 
15.25 0.44 
Log(Average Productivity) 
measure: parent TFP 
0.134 0.09 
Log(Scale) -4.50  0.93 
GDP 19.25  1.26 
GDPPC 9.25  0.71 
DIST 8.89  0.57 




Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Disaggregated Sample (Tables 
3 and 4) 
Variable Name  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Log(Aggregate Sales)  10.90  1.93 
Log(Number) 0.76  0.85 
Log(Average Productivity) 
Measure: parent sales 
14.45 1.36 
Log(Average Productivity) 
Measure: parent TFP 
0.04 0.37 
Log(Scale) -4.31  1.49 
GDP 19.63  1.18 
GDPPC 9.45  0.64 
DIST 8.82  0.64 
ENGLISH 0.25  0.43 
 
 